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Over many decades there has been a significant development of knowledge-based, intelligent 
design tools and their use in the design of process systems. Amongst such tools are “intelligent” 
piping and instrumentation (P&IDs) design environments, coupled to life cycle design 
environments.  These tools can provide opportunities for the development of new, more efficient 
and re-usable approaches to hazard identification and diagnostic systems. They leverage modern 
information technology characteristics of such design environments. These considerations are 
part of a growing trend in industrial digitalization, as reflected in such initiatives as Industry 4.0 
in Europe and driven by the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). 
 
Within this larger industrial digitalization picture, this work discusses the principles, 
developments and application of a hazard identification methodology (BLHAZID) that exploits 
structured representations of the design in the form of ISO15926 data standards. The hazard 
identification methodology is based in knowledge representations of failure modes of equipment 
types that are found in many process designs and how those failures subsequently affect the 
system states and other components. The underlying causal models can be used at various levels 
of aggregation, model fidelity and component inclusion detail. The aggregation can span across 
the most detailed view at the smallest component level through subsystem level to plant level 
perspectives. 
 
The ability to represent and then display failure causation and implications at different levels of 
granularity allows deeper insight into system failures, and the potential for real-time diagnostic 
deployment. The importance of failure and subsequent propagation prevention through the use of  
 
safety instrumented systems and other barrier devices is possible. Outcomes can be visualized in 
informative ways. 
 
The presentation will discuss these intelligent information technology approaches via some a 
case study, highlighting the advantages and challenges such approaches bring to hazard 
identification as well as highlighting other application areas such as real-time diagnosis, 




In the following discussion, we highlight some of the motivations to consider computer aided 
developments driven by the significant focus on industrial digitalization. Increasing digital 
connectivity and the focus on system life cycle processes. 
 
Challenges in failure, causality and hazard identification: 
 
The hazard identification phase of risk management applied to complex process design systems 
is still a significant challenge in terms of detail, time, cost, quality of outcomes and efficient re-
use of generated knowledge. Today, hazard identification tasks are almost exclusively performed 
by Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies that adopt a particular system representation and 
methodology. In some industries Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEA) are also used. 
Both these approaches normally use diverse teams of participants applying a form of critical 
enquiry around the intended design. A primary source of information is represented in Piping 
and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs). In the case of HAZOP studies, the basic approach has 
been accompanied by an ever-growing list of supporting documentation, and extended, rightly or 
wrongly, into other aspects of systems’ analysis, such as non-fluid systems, maintenance, waste 
considerations, commissioning, emissions and the like. 
 
In a comprehensive critique, Baybutt (2015) discussed a range of potential weaknesses using 
HAZOP around team issues, meaning and interpretation of design intent, basic issues related to 
parameters and guidewords as well as technical coverage, operability and specific hazard types. 
He also shows that many of these insights and concerns have been present for decades. Some 
things appear to have not changed. 
 
In a recent review of hazard identification methodologies and tools, Cameron et al. (2017) also 
considered similar issues. The issues can be summarized around recurring challenges for the 
traditional HAZOP methodology as: 
 
 lack of depth in analysis,  
 lack of diversity and imagination within study teams 
 lack of completeness in identifying scenarios 
 lack of completeness in identifying initiating events 
 dealing with the complexity of the process 
 poor documentation and communication of outcomes 
 loss of focus due to the duration of the studies 
 confusion as to the propagation paths of deviation to initiating cause and to consequence 
 repetitiveness of the studies 
 inadequate assessment of the interactions amongst plant, people, procedures 
 review of changes 
Jarvis and Goddard (2016) recently did a study of 100 major losses over the 20 year period: 
1996-2015, in order to understand the common causes of those losses. Major losses were classed 
as losses greater than $US50 million (capital plus business interruption), with no consideration of 
other consequential losses such as civil fines, environmental clean-up, personal injuries and 
reputational damage. Total losses for the period were in the order of $US25 billion.  
The outcomes of this study in regard to the adequacy of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)1 were: 
 7% of mechanical integrity failure (MIF) were primarily associated with PHA 
inadequacies, which was one factor in Management System Failures (MSF) 2  
 28% of non-mechanical integrity failures (NMIF) were associated with PHA activities, 
and, 
 48% of totalled MIF and NMIF were associated with PHA activities 
These insights into current practice put pressure on maintaining very high quality PHA activities, 
and also raise questions concerning the long-term suitability of current practices in complex and 
highly interconnected socio-technical systems. This is especially a challenge around the present 
growth in systems’ connectivity, embedded devices and life cycle perspectives driven by such 
developments as Industry 4.0 and IIoT. In the context of safety and risk we now briefly discuss 
some of the current drivers around smart systems.  
 
Drivers from current industrial digitalization and the opportunities they afford: 
 
For more than 25 years there has been a significant acceleration in industrial digitalization, 
driven primarily by information and communication technologies (ICT) and massive growth of 
internet technologies. Significant process and business performance is now driven by The 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) which refers to: 
 
“a network of physical objects, systems platforms and applications that contain embedded 
technology to communicate and share intelligence with each other, the external environment and 
with people”.       (Accenture, 2018) 
 
Key aspects to consider in the context of IIoT are: 
 
 Investment levels in IIoT are predicted to reach $US123B in 2021 (i-scoop, 2018), 
2018a). 
 Massive sensor deployment and reduced costs – embedded and also wearable. There is 
predicted to be over 50 billion internet connected devices by 2020 from a base of 17 
billion in 2016. (Morgan Stanley 2018a)  
 Massive equipment embedding of micro-controller units (MCUs)  
 Industrial IIoT adoption rising from about 8% of capital budget to 18%. IIoT is a key 
driver of market growth. (Morgan Stanley 2018b) 
 
What does all this mean to the process industries and in particular to function and failure of 
complex systems? For industry, the main IIoT drivers as reported by Morgan Stanley are: 
 
1. Improving operational efficiency (47%) 
2. Improving productivity (31%) 
3. Creating new business opportunities (29%) 
                                                          
1 PHA in this study consisted of: HAZOP, LOPA and SIL activities. 
2 The 7 factors in the Management System Failures were: Inspection programs, Materials & Quality Assurance, 
Operations/Practices/Procedures, Control of Work, PHA and Management of Change, Available Safety Critical 
Devices. 
4. Reducing downtime (28%) 
5. Maximizing asset utilization (27%) 
6. Reducing asset life cycle costs (18%) 
7. Enhancing worker safety (14%) 
 
Given that risk and safety are temporal in nature we need to consider the implications on the 
methodologies and the nature of the software platforms for safety and risk issues into the future. 
What was considered acceptable today will be under threat from tomorrow’s developments. 
Transitions to life cycle, smart systems that are based on systems fundamentals will provide a 
range of benefits not easily achievable today, and fit more effectively into the current digital 
tools of IIoT. 
 
In the next section we consider the specific area of function, failure, risk and the identification of 
hazard in complex designs. This is an area with a long and important history which has 
experienced numerous methodological developments over more than 60 years and more recently 
the development of software support platforms.  
 
For major projects in the process industries, current practices are struggling to provide efficient 
and high quality outcomes as attested by recent studies and critiques already mentioned. It is also 
likely that good, viable solutions will involve an eco-system of integrated approaches: software 
platforms, knowledge based systems, re-use of prior knowledge, real-time gathering and 
processing of data and information to continually incorporate deeper and wider knowledge to 
enhance operational excellence. These will also provide easily accessible and usable corporate 
memory for future developments. 
 
Function, failure and causation: the role of knowledge representation systems 
 
Dealing with complex, highly interconnected systems subject to failure definitely requires 
“systems” approaches, conceptualizations and thinking. There are several important 
considerations to such approaches in the current era of rapid digitalization: 
 
1. System conceptualizations that adequately represent the major elements and their 
interconnections. This involves not just the physical plant, but also procedural aspects 
and human factors, people issues. 
2. The ability to exploit evolving digital representations and data interoperability standards 
such as ISO159263 that provide access to the evolving design in a neutral format. 
3. An approach based on fundamental principles and formal concepts around function, 
capability, failure and causality, and their organized knowledge representation. 
4. Approaches that have applicability across the whole life cycle of product and process, so 
that maximum benefit can be derived from the insights of designers, managers, operators 
and other associated staff and personnel. 
5. The ability to incorporate learning from failures, to identify, capture and enhance 
knowledge of the system over time. This aids in capturing corporate memory. 
6. The ability of the methodology to be adaptable to different scales of representation, such 
as: 
                                                          
3 See the International Organization for Standardization (ISO): https://www.iso.org/search.html?q=15926 
a. Access to multiple causal models of varying complexity and fidelity that can be 
applied as designs develop and mature 
b. The ability to look at the system from highest level of detail at the individual 
component level to more aggregated views 
c. The ability to exclude/include process equipment within any failure analysis 
d. The ability to estimate system failure propagation time scales or track overall 
failure frequency or probability estimates. 
 
There are numerous knowledge based system perspectives and conceptualizations that can be 
adopted to address function, failure and causation. Many had their origin in the 1980s when AI 
and expert systems were making some headway. An early AI based HAZOP system using the 
Prolog declarative language appeared in the 1980s (Cameron, 1986), and other work at 
Loughborough University in the UK has led to commercial realization in the form of the hazid 
software platform4. These approaches essentially took the HAZOP methodology at the time and 
applied structure and some aspects of artificial intelligence tools to aid users in performing their 
tasks. 
 
Many of these approaches are highlighted in the recent review by Cameron et al. (2017), and the 
reader is referred to that for more information. What follows here, is a discussion around the 
conceptualization, development and application of a functional systems framework (FSF) that 
has formed the basis of our own research into looking at the issues around plant, people and 
procedures and their inter-relationships. It needs to be emphasised that this is one of many 
systems based approaches built on knowledge management and use. 
 
The fundamental conceptualization is seen in Figure 1, with basic concepts drawn from 
fundamental system concepts of entities, properties, function, failure and causation (Bunge 
1997). The framework provides a firm foundation to pursue systems related investigations. 
Figure 1 A functional systems framework (FSF) 
                                                          
4 See: https://www.hazid.com/ 
The FSF pictures key components of plant, procedures and people, highlighting components 
capabilities, function and intended system goals. This has been discussed by Seligmann et al. 
(2012) in which he developed a blended hazard identification methodology that combined 
aspects of HAZOP with FMEA to generate deeper insights and better hazard coverage than 
either individual method. It was tested on a commercial design of a Benzene Saturation Unit.  
The underlying causal model that considers the plant components (equipment) and the streams is 
seen in Figure 2. This considers that properties of both plant equipment and streams give rise to a 
set of system capabilities. It is those capabilities, acting together, that deliver the relevant system 
functions for a particular process structure, and these address design intentions as reflected in the 
intended states. Plant components and streams interact in complex ways. Loss of capabilities can 
lead to failures in components and hence impacts on stream properties and vice versa.   
 
Figure 2 Causal model for failures and failure propagation 
With reference to Figure 1, HAZOP considers ‘intended function’ in terms of the stream 
properties and looks at the difference between important ‘intended’ and ‘delivered’ states, 
typically expressed as stream values that can include such properties as pressure, flow, 
temperature, level and concentration. This leads to HAZOP ‘deviations’, which are then traced to 
causes and consequences. In a complementary manner, FMEA starts with failure modes with 
potential failure mode causes, then tracing through to system to identify impacts on function. 
This typical drives left to right in Figure 1, whilst HAZOP drives from right to left. 
The original, overall strategy followed a general workflow which included: 
 Efficient extraction of design information from P&IDs using a neutral format standard. In 
this case: ISO15926, that is now an agreed interoperability data standard between major 
CAD-CAPE software vendor systems.  
 Structured decomposition of the topological information into interconnected subsystems 
that are amenable to investigation and analysis around failure, causes, implications and 
causal pathways. 
 The ability to build, use, modify and extend knowledge based representations of plant 
component models that incorporate known failure modes. These can be built with various 
levels of detail and fidelity. 
 The application of those models to the system design to illicit potential failure types, 
causes and implications across the system. 
 Various forms and levels of visualization and representation of outcomes to understand 
implications for design thinking and operational performance. 
The original implementation of this methodology as an experimental tool required the use of 
several information and knowledge representation and management systems that included: 
 Formal description of equipment capability sets (see Figure 3) 
 Use of failure modes (FM), failure mode causes (FMC) and failure implications (FMI). 
 Development of causal descriptions that link component failures to stream failures and 
vice versa, leading to causal triplets: {cause, mode, implication}: <FMC><FM><FMI>. 
 Development of causal models for common operational modes that incorporate: stream 
inputs and outputs, internal states, FMs and their interconnections. (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 3  Component capabilities structure 
Within the approach taken in this work there is the possibility of adopting multilevel perspectives 
that relate to: 
 Causal model fidelity: providing simple to complex models of the causal relations for a 
component 
 System aggregation level: providing high level views down to highly detailed views into 
the causal structures 
 Inclusion detail: which provides the ability to include or exclude nominated components 
from the subsystems, such as every pipe segment in a subsystem 
These levels of consideration are supplemented with the ability to consider a range of operational 
modes that can affect the failure modes of component. Other temporal factors related to causal 
interactions as well as failure frequency/probability can be considered. 
 
Figure 4  A causal model for a pipe segment 
In the following section we discuss how these knowledge representations can be put to work 
when looking at a particular engineering design to understand failure propagation in the system. 
Application and observations 
The knowledge representation contained in approaches such as BLHAZID or similar 
methodologies can be used to consider a range of failure and hazard issues related to process 
plant. In this case we look at a bulk liquids storage and handling facility that is described in two 
separate, but linked P&IDs. 
P&ID topology is imported via ISO15926 data exchange XML files and automatically analysed, 
decomposed into a series of interconnected subsystems that link inputs to internal subsystems 
and major mass and energy inventories and then to system outputs. Figure 5 shows the P&IDs 
and the first 3 levels of decomposition that is possible. These cover the overall system, the major 
subsystems and then further detail within a chosen subsystem. Disaggregation can proceed down 
to the finest level of every individual component in a Piping Network Segment. 
Individual component types within a subsystem are automatically identified, and can be 
associated with models in a knowledge base (KB).  The particular operational mode of the 
subsystems can be chosen, as well as the level of fidelity of model to be used as well as what 
specific components can be overlooked in the causality analysis. These overlooked items might 
be all pipe segments within a subsystem, where their failures modes are regarded as not 
significant. 
Investigations can be performed on either, or both component failures (CF) in the form of failure 
modes (FM) in process equipment, or functional failures (FF) in the form of changes in stream 
properties. Search algorithms can then be used over the system topology to enumerate the 
possible causes and implications of a nominated failure. The outcomes of the search 
methodologies are shown as causal graphs. Other tabular outputs are also possible. 
Figure 6a shows a situation where the issue of ‘no level’ in one of the main storage tanks (T-3) 
was investigated. The subsystem in which the initial failure occurs is highlighted by a yellow 
background and the specific failure by a yellow chevron shape. The live causal graph can be then 
traced through various intermediate failures to other functional or component failures, which are 
associated with other connected subsystems. In this case the two primary functional failures are 
related to ‘no inlet flow’ to T-3 and an ‘extra gas phase inlet flow’ which raises tank pressure, 
causing tank failure, and loss of containment. 
The detail in Figure 6 is shown at a high level of aggregation. Finer details can be observed by 
opening other subsystem, as seen in Figure 7 where ‘component failures” in the main feedline 
subsystem can be seen. This involves numerous items of plant equipment. This methodology is 
using the causal model shown in Figure 2. 
 
 




Figure 6a Possible causes of 'no level' (in subsystem T-3) storage tank 
 
Figure 7 finer detail of component failures in feed subsystem that induce 'no flow' conditions to 
T-3 
 Besides the functional failures related to states within major equipment or streams be 
investigated but given the blended nature of the methodology failure modes in plant components 
can also be investigated to look at subsequent implications. Figure 8 shows the situation where a 
major inlet flow control valve (v1096) has a major failure (rupture). This generates several 
implications: high flow to the environment, no flow to the tank with potentially low level or no 
level in the tank. The inlet valve failure can also induce a reverse flow from the tank into the 
prior subsystem. 
 
Figure 8  Implications of a major loss of containment through inlet feed control valve. 
These rather straightforward examples illustrate the use of formal knowledge based systems that 
in this case span two P&IDs. More P&IDs can be handled, which potentially allows failure 
pathways to be tracked across significant sections of process plant. 
 
The quality of the outcomes is clearly measured in terms of the underlying causal models, but the 
ability to trace causal links through the design can be very important in unravelling the behaviour 
of the design under numerous failure conditions. It can also be done over many interconnected 
P&IDs. 
 
Using causal graphs is often a much easier means of visualization than equivalent tables, 
although these are also generated when the analyses are performed. Early experience with plant 
operators was encouraging, as they could see the nature of causation visually rather than 
textually, which required much more effort to interpret. 
 
Higher fidelity models can be used to give more detail, and operational modes can be easily set 
to investigate what is often a difficult issue in more traditional techniques. Numerous other 
applications are possible. 
 
 
Where to from here? 
 
This paper has discussed the need for new approaches that can provide knowledge based tools 
for understanding failure implications in process designs. Given the growing complexity of 
information and interconnectedness of process systems, efficient investigation tools as part of 
risk management that deliver high quality and economically efficient outcomes are required. 
Such knowledge based approaches should: 
 Support human decision making across the whole life cycle from early conceptual design 
through detailed design and operations 
 Adapt and grow as accumulated operational knowledge is integrated back into systems 
that can then easily exploit that knowledge in new situations. 
 Provide advice in operational circumstances and also for new projects 
 Are integrated with plant information systems, including real-time sensor data to provide 
pro-active functions that can help guide operators’ decisions based on causal 
representations. This leads to real-time diagnostic tools, and the potential to build 
operator guidance systems off the outcomes of failure analyses. 
 The ability to consider how barriers or lack of barriers affect failure propagation and the 
likelihood of such situations. 
Whatever the approach to be taken in this era of IIoT and knowledge systems, it highly likely 
that the resultant systems will integrate numerous interoperable methodologies into real-time 
systems that continue to grow over the life cycle of the plant and product. It is also clear that the 
current digitalization emphasis of Industry x.0 (Schaeffer, 2017) or smart manufacturing will 
also include high fidelity quantitative modelling and simulation to complement the qualitative 
and semi-quantitative approaches.   
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